Labor, the Coalition and One Nation all want net overseas migration to fall. Arguing about the number is the easy part. The harder question is which visa streams — and which skills — Australia can actually afford to lose.
Australia’s migration debate has become dominated by numbers: 225,000, below 200,000, 130,000. Each is presented as an answer to concerns about housing affordability, rental pressure, infrastructure and population growth. But there is a fundamental problem with this debate: net overseas migration is not a visa quota.
Before Australians decide what the “right” migration number should be, we need to answer a much harder question: who exactly should we stop letting in? Doctors, nurses, teachers, engineers and builders? IT professionals, accountants and chefs? International students, working holiday makers or partners of Australians?
The answer matters because Australia is not simply deciding how many people it wants. We are deciding what skills our economy needs, which industries require workers, where those workers are needed and how quickly Australia can build the housing and infrastructure required to accommodate population growth.
Net overseas migration — NOM — is the official measure of population change resulting from people moving into and out of Australia. The Australian Bureau of Statistics uses what is known as the 12/16-month rule. Broadly, someone arriving in Australia contributes to NOM if they were previously living overseas and spend at least 12 months in Australia during the following 16 months. Those 12 months do not need to be continuous. Likewise, someone previously living in Australia who leaves for sufficiently long can count as a migrant departure.
NOM therefore measures where people actually live over time. It is not simply the number of visas granted or people crossing Australia’s border. The latest ABS figures put annual NOM at approximately 301,000 in the year to December 2025 — substantially below the extraordinary post-pandemic peak, but still at the centre of Australia’s political debate.
Importantly, NOM is not simply a count of foreigners arriving on Australian visas. In 2024–25, migrant arrivals included approximately 64,000 Australian citizens and 53,000 New Zealand citizens. Australian citizens departing for long enough can also reduce NOM.
Temporary migration is particularly important. Of the 568,000 migrant arrivals recorded in 2024–25, approximately 157,000 were international students and 78,000 were working holiday makers. There were also around 46,000 temporary skilled migrant arrivals and 40,000 permanent skilled migrant arrivals. Those figures are migrant arrivals rather than each group’s net contribution to NOM, but they illustrate just how different the migration population is from the permanent Migration Program.
A temporary migrant can contribute to NOM without ever becoming a permanent resident. Conversely, granting permanent residence to someone who has already lived in Australia for several years may have little immediate impact on population size because that person is already here. That has an important consequence for politicians promising precise NOM numbers. Government can certainly influence NOM — substantially — through visa eligibility, student and temporary migration settings and other policy levers. But it cannot determine exactly how many Australians will return home, how many will leave, how long temporary migrants will remain or precisely when people will depart. NOM is an outcome, not simply a quota.
The Albanese Government’s 2026–27 Budget forecasts NOM of approximately 295,000 in 2025–26, falling to 245,000 in 2026–27 and 225,000 from 2027–28. The Coalition proposes a different mechanism. Opposition Leader Angus Taylor wants NOM linked more directly to Australia’s capacity to construct housing and has said the resulting figure is expected to be well below 200,000. Liberal Senator Andrew Bragg has separately proposed a figure around 180,000, although that number has not been adopted as formal Coalition policy.
One Nation wants to go considerably further. Pauline Hanson has most recently reiterated a NOM target of 130,000, although conflicting statements from party representatives about migration numbers and different visa categories have produced considerable confusion around the detail of the policy.
The precise numbers differ, but every party eventually confronts the same problem. Cutting international students substantially affects one of Australia’s major export industries; cutting working holiday makers can leave agriculture, tourism and hospitality without workers; cutting skilled migration indiscriminately can restrict access to occupations Australia is already struggling to fill; and cutting family migration can mean longer waits for Australian citizens and permanent residents seeking to reunite with partners and family.
So the debate cannot end with how many migrants Australia should have. It has to ask which migrants Australia actually needs.
Fortunately, governments do not have to guess. Jobs and Skills Australia’s 2025 Occupation Shortage List found that 29 per cent of assessed occupations were in shortage, down from 33 per cent in 2024 and 36 per cent in 2023. The labour market has softened, but significant shortages remain, particularly across areas including healthcare, education and construction.
If Australia wants substantially fewer migrants, there is a strong argument that skilled migration should become increasingly concentrated on occupations for which independent evidence demonstrates genuine workforce demand. But today’s shortage list cannot be the only test.
Migration policy has to anticipate tomorrow’s economy as well as respond to today’s vacancies. Cybersecurity, advanced technology, defence capability, energy infrastructure and emerging industries may require specialist skills before conventional shortage statistics fully reveal the problem. National data can also hide severe shortages in particular states or regions.
The objective should therefore not be a simplistic rule that an occupation either appears on today’s shortage list or disappears from migration entirely. It should be evidence-based prioritisation. And Australia already has a useful model for doing that.
The Commonwealth gives states and territories limited skilled nomination allocations precisely so they can respond to their own workforce and demographic needs. Home Affairs expressly describes these programs as allowing jurisdictions to meet their unique workforce and demographic needs and address critical skills shortages.
That makes intuitive sense. The ACT can target skills needed in Canberra, Western Australia can respond to its labour market, and South Australia can focus on different industries and regional needs. When migration places are limited, direct them towards the skills the economy actually needs.
But identifying the right skill is only half the equation. Australia also needs to consider where that skill ultimately ends up.
A state can use one of its limited subclass 190 nomination places to select a worker because it has identified a particular workforce need. Yet once a Skilled Nominated subclass 190 visa is granted, there is no Commonwealth visa condition requiring that permanent resident to continue living or working in the jurisdiction that nominated them. Applicants may give undertakings or make commitments to the nominating state or territory as part of its nomination process, but those commitments should not be confused with a Commonwealth visa condition legally confining the holder to that jurisdiction.
That creates a potential disconnect between where Australia identifies a shortage and where the skill ultimately ends up.
The Skilled Work Regional subclass 491 visa demonstrates that geographic visa conditions are possible. Condition 8579 requires its holder, while in Australia, to live, work and study only in a designated regional area. That does not require a 491 holder to remain in one particular state or community, and subclass 491 is a provisional rather than permanent visa, so it is not a direct model for subclass 190. But it raises an important policy question.
If a regional community needs doctors, should success be measured merely by granting visas to doctors — or by actually retaining enough doctors in the communities experiencing the shortage? If a state nominates teachers, engineers or construction workers because it has established a genuine need for them, should migration policy pay greater attention to whether those skills remain where the need exists?
There may be merit in examining stronger retention mechanisms for state-nominated migration. Any reform affecting permanent residents would require careful legal and policy design and would need to account for personal mobility, family circumstances and changing employment conditions. But the objective is worth considering: bring the skills Australia needs — and develop migration pathways that help retain those skills where they are needed most.
That would connect migration policy more closely with measurable outcomes: homes built, classrooms staffed, healthcare delivered, infrastructure constructed and genuine workforce shortages reduced.
The Skilled Independent subclass 189 visa operates differently. Applicants enter SkillSelect and may subsequently receive an invitation from the Commonwealth to apply for permanent residence. They do not require a state or territory government to determine that their particular occupation is needed within a particular jurisdiction.
That does not mean subclass 189 is completely untargeted. Home Affairs can vary occupations and invitation numbers according to the needs of the Australian economy and the number of applications already being processed, and occupation ceilings can also be used. But the latest invitation round demonstrates just how broad the program can be.
On 4 June 2026, Home Affairs issued 10,000 invitations for subclass 189. The occupations invited included medical practitioners, teachers, engineers and numerous construction trades. They also included occupations such as Management Consultant, Economist, Solicitor, Barrister, Actuary, Statistician, Multimedia Specialist, Arts Administrator or Manager, Music Director, Musician, Dancer or Choreographer, Tennis Coach and Footballer.
That does not mean any of those occupations are unnecessary or that people working in them make no contribution to Australia. That is not the point. The question is what should happen when independent skilled migration places are limited and Australia simultaneously says it must reduce migration because housing and infrastructure are struggling to keep pace.
Should occupations experiencing persistent national shortages compete for those opportunities on substantially the same basis as occupations where Australia already has adequate labour supply? There may be perfectly legitimate reasons why some should. Shortage data is a snapshot; industries change, major projects create new demand, strategic capabilities may not appear neatly in vacancy statistics, and Australia may want exceptional talent in fields that will never appear on a conventional shortage list. But these are arguments for better prioritisation, not for avoiding prioritisation altogether.
This becomes particularly interesting when the June invitation round is compared with the Australian Government’s newest processing rules. On 25 July 2026, Ministerial Direction 119 came into effect.
It gives the highest processing priority to specified skilled applications supporting Australia’s law enforcement and defence interests. Applications relating to construction, healthcare and teaching occupations also receive elevated priority, while whether an applicant was in or outside Australia when applying affects their position in the processing hierarchy.
But Ministerial Direction 119 does not decide who receives a subclass 189 invitation. It determines the order in which relevant applications are processed after they have been lodged.
Australia therefore has several distinct mechanisms at work. Occupation eligibility determines which occupations can access particular migration pathways; invitation and selection determine who receives the opportunity to apply through SkillSelect; and processing priority determines which lodged applications are dealt with first. State nomination adds another layer, with jurisdictions selecting migrants according to their individual workforce and demographic priorities.
Australia is therefore already prioritising skilled migrants. The more interesting question is whether those priorities are sufficiently aligned.
If construction, healthcare, teaching, defence and law enforcement skills are important enough to receive special treatment once a visa application has been lodged, should national workforce priorities also play a more transparent role earlier, when limited independent skilled migration opportunities are allocated?
Population growth unquestionably adds to housing demand. More people require somewhere to live, so reducing NOM should reduce additional housing demand, all other things being equal. But housing also has a supply side: Australia needs workers to build homes, and construction and trade shortages remain significant.
Consider two hypothetical skilled migrants. One is a carpenter in an occupation experiencing a persistent shortage. The other works in an occupation for which Australia’s labour supply is already adequate. Both need somewhere to live, but the carpenter also increases Australia’s capacity to produce housing.
That is not a judgement about the worth of either individual or profession. It is a judgement about what Australia expects a limited skilled migration program to achieve.
Healthcare creates the same paradox. Population growth increases demand for healthcare, but migrant doctors, nurses and other healthcare professionals also expand Australia’s capacity to deliver it. The same logic applies to teachers, engineers and infrastructure workers. Migration can increase demand and increase productive capacity at the same time.
That is why saying simply “cut migration” tells Australians remarkably little about the consequences. Which migration? Which skills? Which industries? Which regions? Those questions determine whether a lower migration number actually produces a better outcome.
Australia does face a genuine population-management challenge. Housing, infrastructure and public services cannot expand infinitely or instantly, and it is reasonable for government to consider the number of additional people the country can sustainably accommodate.
But NOM is not a dial in Canberra that can simply be turned from 300,000 to 225,000, 180,000 or 130,000. Every reduction ultimately has to come from somewhere. And once government decides migration should fall, composition becomes more important, not less.
Which shortages can Australia address by training more Australians? Which genuinely require migration? Which migrants increase Australia’s productive capacity? What specialist capabilities will Australia need in five or ten years? Where are those workers actually required? And how do we retain scarce skills in the places where they are needed?
Australia already has much of the machinery required to answer those questions. Jobs and Skills Australia assesses workforce shortages. States and territories identify their own needs. Home Affairs can control occupation eligibility and SkillSelect invitations. The Commonwealth can establish processing priorities. Employer-sponsored migration can connect workers directly with jobs.
The missing ingredient is a clearer connection between all of those mechanisms and a transparent statement of what Australia’s skilled migration program is actually trying to achieve. That could mean stronger national priority tiers, more frequent adjustment of occupation priorities, greater reliance on independent labour-market evidence and specific justification where an occupation is prioritised despite there being neither a demonstrated shortage nor an identified strategic requirement.
For state-nominated migration, it should also mean looking beyond attraction and asking how successfully scarce skills are being retained in the jurisdictions and communities that need them.
Ultimately, Labor, the Coalition and One Nation are arguing over different numbers. But the number alone cannot tell Australians whether migration policy is working.
A NOM of 130,000 with the wrong skills mix could conceivably deliver worse economic and service outcomes than a higher NOM containing workers Australia desperately needs. Equally, a large skilled migration program cannot justify itself merely by describing everyone within it as “skilled”. Australia should be able to explain why particular skills are being selected, where those skills are needed and what problem their migration is intended to solve.
So perhaps the question Australians should ask their political leaders is no longer simply:
It should be:
Which migrants will you prioritise, where do we need them, how will we retain those skills — and what evidence are you using to make those decisions?
Because the smartest migration program is not necessarily the biggest, nor is it necessarily the smallest.
It is the one that can demonstrate that migration is being used deliberately: to bring the right skills to the right places, strengthen Australia’s productive capacity and address genuine housing, healthcare, education, infrastructure and workforce challenges.
Zhanna Heenan
Registered Migration Agents
Director of Heenan & Browne Visa and Migration Services
Australian Bureau of Statistics — Overseas Migration, 2024–25
Official ABS statistics covering net overseas migration, migrant arrivals and departures, citizenship and visa categories. The ABS recorded 568,000 migrant arrivals in 2024–25, including approximately 157,000 temporary students.
https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/people/population/overseas-migration/2024-25
Australian Bureau of Statistics — National, state and territory population
The latest ABS population statistics, including net overseas migration for the year ending December 2025.
https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/people/population/national-state-and-territory-population/latest-release
Australian Bureau of Statistics — Understanding Net Overseas Migration
ABS explanation of NOM, the 12/16-month rule and why NOM should not be confused with overseas arrivals and departures or visas granted.
https://www.abs.gov.au/articles/use-net-overseas-migration-statistics-understand-overseas-migration-not-overseas-arrivals-and-departures
Australian Government — Budget 2026–27
Budget forecasts for net overseas migration, including approximately 295,000 in 2025–26, 245,000 in 2026–27 and 225,000 from 2027–28.
https://budget.gov.au/
Department of Home Affairs — SkillSelect Invitation Rounds
Official subclass 189 invitation-round results, including the 4 June 2026 round in which 10,000 invitations were issued.
https://immi.homeaffairs.gov.au/visas/working-in-australia/skillselect/invitation-rounds
Department of Home Affairs — Skilled Visa Processing Priorities
Official information on Ministerial Direction 119 and processing priorities for skilled visa applications.
https://immi.homeaffairs.gov.au/visas/getting-a-visa/visa-processing-times/visa-processing-priorities/skilled-visa
Department of Home Affairs — State and Territory Nomination Allocations
Information on state and territory nomination programs and their role in meeting jurisdiction-specific workforce and demographic needs.
https://immi.homeaffairs.gov.au/what-we-do/state-and-territory-nomination-allocations
Jobs and Skills Australia — 2025 Occupation Shortage Report
Independent analysis of occupational shortages, including the finding that 29 per cent of assessed occupations were in shortage in 2025, compared with 33 per cent in 2024 and 36 per cent in 2023.
https://www.jobsandskills.gov.au/
Federal Register of Legislation — Migration Regulations 1994
The Migration Regulations contain the visa conditions applicable to skilled visas, including condition 8579 applying to relevant regional visa holders.
https://www.legislation.gov.au/
Recent reporting on Australia’s migration-policy debate
Contemporary reporting should also be consulted for the most recent public statements by Labor, Coalition and One Nation representatives, particularly where proposed NOM figures have not been enacted as formal government policy.
30 September, 2026
23 September, 2026
